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Enhancing survival by not enhancing survival:  
Sebeok’s semiotics and the ultimate paradox of modelling  
  
Paul Cobley, Middlesex University 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Tom Sebeok lives in recent memory partly because of his phenomenal networking, 
administration, editing and promotion of individuals in semiotics as well as the 
disciplinary field in general. Yet this must not be allowed to obscure a body of 
published writings that is as original as it is eloquent. The current paper will discuss 
one of Sebeok’s most penetrating insights arising from his consideration of a 
fundamental paradox in modern intellectual life, one that traverses the bridge between 
the ‘hard’ and ‘human’ sciences. This paper will argue that Sebeok’s 1979 review of 
investigations into animals’ aesthetic behaviour, originally cast as an early chapter of 
a much larger book, contains the key observation which drives contemporary, 21
st
 
century semiotics. Sebeok’s abduction of the riddle posits that “aesthetic sensibility 
plays the part of a delicate sieve” among animals. In so doing, this paper will argue, it 
not only clarifies the modelling process as a whole, across verbal and averbal modes, 
but also provides an agenda for re-thinking tertiary modelling, the humanities and 
global arts policy. 
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Ladies and gentleman, I am honoured and delighted by the conferral of this award on 
me. Honoured, especially, because I partake of an outward-facing tradition enshrined 
in this Society and this award, in which European contributors to semiotics, not just 
American ones, are regularly recognized. Delighted, especially, because the award is 
in the name of Thomas A. Sebeok, a mentor to so many, including myself, and an 
incomparable figure in the history of the entire academy whose work is also, aptly, 
the focus of the paper which follows. Sebeok bestrode European and American 
semiotics, ultimately creating the conditions for global semiotics (2001). The global 
cross-fertilization he saw in semiotics was reflected in his 1991 book on Semiotics in 
the United States which I then echoed in 1997 in my comic book, Semiotics for 
Beginners, the latter of which contains an illustration of American semiotics as a 
“chimera” (119) wrought from the influence of émigrés such as Jakobson, Maritain, 
Carnap and Cassirer. The other side of the story, of course, is that Sebeok was 
responsible for nurturing a US semiotics ‘proper’ – partly through his promotion of 
Peirce to the foremost position in semiotics that he occupies today; partly through his 
tireless encouragement of American semioticians that it would be invidious to list 
since quite a few of them are assembled here this evening. 
 
Yet, this last point also poses a problem for our assessment of Sebeok because, 
while it is a matter of the most heartfelt of our memories of a scholar who profoundly 
touched our world, it is a point that is also likely to diminish as scholars who knew 
him retire or die. It can also obscure the fact that today’s key drivers in semiotics – 
the pre-eminence of Peirce has been mentioned, but biosemiotics might be added – 
derive from Sebeok’s writings and guidance in the field. Moreover, Sebeok’s 
eclecticism as a polymath has not helped the situation of attributing just one 
achievement or innovation to him as an intellectual mnemonic. Acknowledging this 
with only a faint trace of bewilderment, Sebeok wrote in 1986 (ix): 
 
My writing career has been, at least in this one respect, idiosyncratic: it had to 
mark and chart, step by step, its own peculiar champaign. My earliest papers, 
beginning in 1942, were technical articles in this or that domain of Uralic 
linguistics, ethnography and folklore, with a sprinkling of contributions to North 
and South American linguistics. In 1954, my name became fecklessly 
associated with psycholinguistics, then successively, with explorations in 
mythology, religious studies, and stylistic problems. It now takes special effort 
for me to even revive the circumstances under which I came to publish, in 1955, 
a hefty tome on the supernatural, another, in 1958, on games, and yet another, in 
1961, utilizing a computer for extensive sorting of literary information. 
  
By 1962, I had edged my way into animal communication studies. Two years 
after that, I first whiffled through what Gavin Ewart evocatively called “the 
tulgey wood of semiotics”. In 1966, I published three books which temporarily 
bluffed some of my friends into conjecturing that I was about to metamorphose 
into a historiographer of linguistics. 
 
In the period after 1966, Sebeok inaugurated international semiotics in all its many 
forms, through the fashionable moment of the 1970s, but even then pre-figuring the 
developments which would come to fascinate semioticians in the twenty-first century. 
If one is to take this tack, then the nodal point of Sebeok’s work – for those who find 
it easier to sum up intellectual movements in this way – would be his formulation of 
‘modelling’ after Lotman (see Sebeok 1988, in particular), culminating in his 
penultimate, and unjustly neglected, book, The Forms of Meaning (2000) written with 
Marcel Danesi. Here, Sebeok and Danesi presented a blueprint for a new vocabulary 
for semiotics, infusing the recent history of sign study with a modelling systems 
perspective. 
 
However, whilst I would certainly concur that modelling is central to 
contemporary semiotics (and have done so in print – for example, Cobley 2010), I 
intend to argue tonight that the central argument of Sebeok’s work is actually more 
strategic than has been considered hitherto. In what follows, I will refer closely, with 
numerous quotes, to Sebeok’s 1979 essay, ‘Prefigurements of art’, which has a cult 
following among some semioticians like myself who feel that it is under-cited. 
Published in Semiotica as part of a special issue on semiotics of culture edited by 
Irene Portis-Winner and Jean Umiker-Sebeok, the issue itself derived from the annual 
meeting of the American Anthropological Association in 1977 and the essay is 
seventy pages long (including illustrations). It mainly consists of a literature review of 
extant work on “aesthetic behavior” among non-human animals. It does not take 
much imagination to see how the essay might sit in the larger book on communication 
in animals and humans that Sebeok hinted in a number of places that he was writing 
(for example, ‘Japanese monkey performances’ 1986: 115). If this projected volume 
could be reconstructed from Sebeok’s archived unpublished papers, it is possible that 
it would assume a status akin to the Grundrisse or Freud’s ‘Project for a scientific 
psychology’. More so than them, the thesis of ‘Prefigurements’ is adumbrated and 
telegraphic, as well as subtle; for that reason, and because of what I see as its great 
importance in semiotics and beyond, I seek to amplify it here. 
 
The general purpose of ‘Prefigurements of art’ is to ask 
 
whether the optimal design of certain animal communication systems can allow, 
given certain contextual conditions, for a superimposed aesthetic function. In 
other words, how reasonable is it to search for prefigurements of aesthetically 
charged averbal sign configurations in man's animal ancestry? (5) 
 
For Sebeok, the idea that the verbal codes of humans simply replaced the averbal 
systems of animals is untenable and he is sceptical of the idea that the phylogenesis of 
language can be sought in averbal communication systems (8). Yet, this does not rule 
out the tracing of prefigurements of human averbal aesthetic behaviour in the 
activities of some animals. This is because human averbal codes have their 
provenance in the minor hemisphere, “a very superior animal brain”, whereas the 
verbal arts originate in the dominant hemisphere (7). 
 
One of the most well-known examples of aesthetic behaviour in animals is the 
activities of the satinbird (Ptylonorhynchus violaceus) who appear to paint the inside 
of their bower for purely decorative reasons. It seems that the jury is still out on this 
issue, with researchers still pursuing the possibility that the painting serves the 
survival purpose of attracting a mate (Katsuno et al 2013). Yet, even strict 
evolutionists in the past – Sebeok cites Thomas Huxley and Dobzhansky – have been 
willing to embrace the idea that, in such activity, there is “definitely the beginning of 
aesthetics” (6). As Sebeok notes, 
 
All researches in this field are stamped by a tension between a deeply felt 
conviction on the part of many distinguished and sensitive biologists that artistic 
activity indeed exists in the animal world and the inability to face its presumed 
lack of importance, even uselessness (30).  
 
By “uselessness”, here, Sebeok is referring principally to the lack of a strict survival 
motive underlying the activity, some means by which the animal’s semiosis is not 
necessarily geared to the preservation of itself and the passing on of its genes. 
However, we will re-visit this idea of “uselessness” and extend it in the process of 
providing a gloss Sebeok’s findings. 
 
For the practical purpose of conveying the knowledge garnered from his 
literature review, Sebeok identifies four general areas of aesthetic semiosis that have 
been observed among animals. The first involves kinaesthetic signs, semiosis in 
movement, particularly as it is envisaged as prefiguring human dance. The second is 
the realm of musical signs, auditory semiosis that goes beyond communicative calls, 
even encompassing rudimentary melody, harmony and sequenced repetition. The 
third comprises pictorial signs, framed visual embellishment which takes place 
seemingly for its own sake. The final area of semiosis involves architectural signs, 
semiosis invested in building, beyond the practical requirements of shelter, warmth 
and protection. 
 
In considering kinaesthetic signs, Sebeok draws attention to now famous 
examples such as those of the crane, the chimpanzee and birds in the species of the 
family Pipridae (including el toledo), the latter of which both sing and dance. Dance 
in animals, he concludes, is homologous with human dance, “much as laughter and 
smiling fit into the phyletic scale” (17). That is to say, dance is passed on through the 
genome rather than from local and traditional practices. Sebeok is at pains to stress 
that this does not entail that dance is innate: “information may be communicated to a 
succeeding generation in several different ways, and therefore, since form depends on 
the function, convergence can hardly be excluded” (18). With this last comment, 
along with a few others in the article, Sebeok presents an explicitly biosemiotic 
perspective in stark contrast to a reductive neo-Darwinian one. 
 
The musical signs that seem to amount to aesthetic behaviour in non-human 
animals are various. As Sebeok notes, an early proposal regarding ornithomusicology 
stems from a contention of Montaigne that humans first heard birdsong and then went 
on to imitate it (18). Yet, this cannot stand as a pronouncement on the origins of 
music because of the body of work on musical signs among animals such cicadas, 
humpback whales and singing gibbons that Sebeok urges us to consider. Despite the 
complexity of animal musical signs, Sebeok is circumspect in noting that it is 
premature to take for granted the aesthetic function in such creatures. Extant 
knowledge about animals’ pictorial signs, on the other hand, enable Sebeok to draw 
more general conclusions. In addition to birds’ decoration of nests, he also discusses 
the finger paintings, reported by Desmond Morris, of the young chimpanzees, Congo, 
Alpha and Betsy (32-4). Not only did the chimps seem to take pleasure in creating 
their paintings, they also spent time observing their paintings when completed. A later 
Huxley, Julian, referred to the chimp paintings as evidence of “aesthetic 
potentialities” among primates. 
  
It is possibly the reports of architectural signs that provide particularly 
spectacular evidence of “aesthetic potentialities” for Sebeok. He writes (43), 
 
In looking at the endlessly manifold abodes constructed by animals - that serve 
perhaps to trap prey, to protect or comfort the architect or its kind, especially the 
young, or to attract the attention of a potential mate - we must look for the 
artistic value that may be involved, although subordinated to the principal 
interest of the “survival machine”, as Dawkins (1978: 21, 25) calls the 
temporary receptacles housing the colony of genes inhabiting every plant and 
animal. If there is such a subsidiary purpose, falling passively under the sway of 
‘mere’ biological advantage, or supplementing it, an effort must be made to 
ferret out this aesthetic component. Such a quest is far from trivial, for, in the 
end, it is tantamount to asking:  what is art? 
 
The architectural activities of animals, Sebeok argues, are to be understood as 
manifestations of tool use. Animals have certainly been observed to use tools for 
specific purposes in a range of different ways. Yet, Sebeok draws attention to those 
studies which reveal tool use with no apparent specific purpose, citing Frisch to the 
effect that we cannot know what goes through the animal’s mind during such tool use 
but, nevertheless, again following Frisch, there appears to be evidence of “aesthetic 
feelings” among such creatures (48). A case in point, notes Sebeok, is the beaver, 
whose skills seem to be innate but also comprise remarkable adaptation to 
environmental circumstances. 
 At this point, it is worth digressing for a moment to acknowledge one 
component of Sebeok’s vocabulary in addressing these issues. In discussing 
architectural signs, Sebeok, above, adopts Dawkins’ unequivocal term, ‘Survival-
machines’. There is a small hint of both irony and bathos as Sebeok introduces the 
phrase, as if he is deliberately lapsing into reductive mode for purposes of mere 
exposition, in contrast to the biosemiotic perspective that, as noted earlier, guides the 
general argument in this essay. At the same time, though, it should be acknowledged 
that Sebeok’s biosemiotics freely incorporates a Darwinian dimension and contains 
frequent reference to the work of Darwin; this character of Sebeok’s work, alive to the 
environmental demands of semiosis but grounded in biological determination at key 
points, is also evident, I have argued, in his shifting conception of ‘code’ (Cobley 
2014). Although Dawkins is frequently seen as the arch-determinist in neo-
Darwinism, Sebeok cites the ‘survival-machine’ idea repeatedly during the years 
following Dawkins’ publication (1976) of The Selfish Gene. Rather than throwing out 
Darwin with the neo-Darwinist bathwater, Sebeok incorporates or retains the hard-
nosedness of evolutionary biology as part of the semiotic armoury. He writes (1986: 
3) that 
 
all survival-machines are only a sign’s way of making another sign . . . Each 
survival-machine thus operates in the manner of a double agential transformer, 
as it were, firstly, of any ‘object’ (more precisely: of the Heraclitean notion of 
logos, the formal structure that imparts any ‘object’ its unity and stability) into a 
sign, by a process of ‘perceptual selection of sensed characteristics’ (Gregory 
1981: 402), adhering to criteria we admittedly know all too little about. What 
are the teleonomic goals of such transformations? In other words, what is the 
function – the force – of semiosis, a criterial attribute of life, in general? I think 
the answers to these questions must be realized in terms of survival. In the short 
term, the process of sign-action guarantees to the subject a kind of lifelong 
cohesive solidarity. It maintains the identity of its semiotic self by a ceaseless 
rearrangement of its ego-quality (Jakob von Uexküll’s “Ich-ton”; 1940 [1982]” 
84), propelled by the sort of ongoing dialogue so distinctly recognized by Peirce 
(6.338). In the long term, semiosis, by indefinitely spawning interpretants, 
permeates (“perfuses”) the universe with likeness (i.e., icons).  
 
What Sebeok presents here is a complex interplay, a back and forth, of the exigencies 
of life and the mutability of the semiosis that characterizes it – from stability to 
teleonomy, from, transformation to survival, from sign to sign. Suspending the 
interplay for a moment, it is possible to see that  
 
The proper history of semiotics is thus tantamount to a reasoned and versant 
account of the laws of Nature, particularly as explicated in terms of Darwinian 
evolution, and encompassing the totality of the peculiarly Lamarckian 
adaptation exhibited in the human animal par excellence – culture (Sebeok 
1986: 81). 
 
From the same period as ‘Prefigurements’, Sebeok wrote even more explicitly about 
Lamarckian evolution in animals in the essay ‘Fables of fact’. Reviewing six animal 
behaviours that incorporate extremely high degrees of adaptation, such as honey 
guide birds and ticks, he writes that “in the evolution of this behavior, factors other 
than mere random mutations and natural selection must have played a role” (1986: 
38). 
 
While Lamarckian adaptation is insuperably associated with the evolution of 
culture and Darwinian selection guides biological developments, Sebeok always 
maintains that the picture is, in fact, fuzzy. One reason for this is embodied in 
Sebeok’s frequent reminders that the binaristic myth of ‘nature/culture’ constitutes a 
misguided denial of the fact that culture is merely one fairly small component of 
nature. At the same time, it is evident from Sebeok’s simple observation on human 
modelling – which is so often repressed that it has to be repeated like a mantra – that 
“The authentic singularity of man consists of this, that he alone disposes over a pair of 
communicative codes” (8): the uniquely human verbal and the cross-species 
nonverbal (or averbal). In light of these postulates, culture, including aesthetic 
behaviour, is not just made up of verbal arts. This is an uncontroversial, even trivial, 
statement because it is so obvious. What is less obvious and what Sebeok confronts in 
‘Prefigurements’ is whether the averbal arts of humans have a substrate in the 
activities of other animals with which humans share this averbality. Yet, more telling 
still, reflecting the fuzzy ‘back and forth’ picture of Lamarckian adaptation and 
Darwinian selection, as well as brain structure, is the advantage that verbality secures 
for humans. Paradoxically – because non-human animals, of course, possess no 
fledged faculty resembling language – the survival virtues of verbality present a clue 
to the purposiveness of ‘useless’ aesthetic animal behaviour. Language conferred on 
humans advantages for survival and 
 
the advantage lay in the extraordinary suppleness of the verbal code – 
unprecedented in evolution, save for the genetic code to decompose and 
reconstitute in the human Innenwelt the incoming sign vehicles filtered out from 
the relevant portion of man’s environments or Umwelt, by our total sensory 
apparatus. This suppleness is a consequence of the dual organization of the verbal 
code, which makes it feasible for the human mind to model the world and then, in 
the fashion of a tinkertoy, to ‘play around’ with this model: to take it apart, then 
reassemble it in may different novel arrangements (Sebeok 1986: 91). 
 
This plasticity is now well known and is a mainstay of much discussion in 
contemporary cognitive science. For some time already, Sebeok suggested that 
grammar allows humans: to posit several putative pasts, to fabricate many kinds of 
possible future worlds, to imagine death, to create both poetry and science and to 
project into the future in a fashion that is of a piece with the potential production of an 
infinite number of sentences from a limited syntax. Above all, perhaps, it allows 
humans to classify their astonishingly variegated Umwelt. 
 
Against the background of this movement across averbal and verbal realms 
underwritten by the cartography of the human brain, in ‘Prefigurements’ Sebeok is 
able to draw conclusions about non-human animals’ aesthetic behaviour. Some of 
these re-cast the conclusions in his literature review. So one argument that Sebeok re-
visits is that animals’ aesthetic behaviour is cybernetic in character. It is like a 
thermostat or, better still, homeostasis, in keeping an organism’s Innenwelt in tune 
with its Umwelt. Sebeok points to evidence in the literature, especially, of birds that 
design neater – but not more utilitarian – nests in their second season of nest-building. 
The assumption is that the ‘neater’ nests offer some satisfaction equivalent to ‘letting 
off steam’. Connected to this is the second or subsidiary conclusion, that aesthetic 
behaviour produces self-reward in, as Desmond Morris says, “the unleashing of 
surplus nervous energy” (quoted by Sebeok 1979: 36).  
 
Yet these conclusions do not really reach too far and they reveal very little 
about what human aesthetic behaviour entails. It is in Sebeok’s further conclusion 
about classification that we come to the crux of the matter in the current paper. For it 
is here that Sebeok not only sheds light on the somewhat hackneyed issue of ‘what is 
art?’ but also provides clues for where researchers should look if they wish to address 
the question ‘what is it to be human?’ The latter question, of course, is by far the most 
profound of the two because it aims at a description of universals – real universals, as 
opposed to the propositions denounced by postcolonial critique and the repudiation of 
grand narratives, for example – whereas the question of ‘what is art?’ is subject to so 
many historical vagaries, particularly the attempt to distinguish it from what is not 
‘art’, that it is impossible to reach anything approaching a definitive conclusion. 
Nevertheless, the more democratic concept of aesthetic behaviour, traversing the 
world of animals, does enable some consideration of what it is to be human. Sebeok’s 
conclusion is that animals ‘indulge’ in aesthetic behaviour because it is a particular 
form of classifying that is operative within their acts of modelling. As such, aesthetic 
behaviour is an activity with a purpose, even while it seems to have nothing to do 
with the +, - and 0 of non-human animal existence: the positive seeking out of 
nourishment/comfort, the avoidance of harm/predation, the general awareness of 
elements of the environment that can be safely ignored. “The capacity for effective 
classification”, Sebeok writes (41)  
 
is important for survival, perhaps on a par with eating and sex. If so, techniques 
of classification were bound to evolve so as to be a source of pleasure to the 
animal and thus to shape the non-random differential reproduction of its genes 
(natural selection) . . . In other words, although art is always unpredictable, ‘it 
appears to us to have been directed by some organizing center of large 
codimension, far from the normal structures of ordinary thought, but still in 
resonance with the main emotional or genetic structures underlying our 
conscious thought’ (Thom 1975: 316). 
 
Aesthetic behaviour, as formulated here, heightens cognitive differentiation. It is a 
form of modelling with its own specific procedures, practices and rewards. The 
product of aesthetic behaviour is to simultaneous embellish and furnish animals’ 
niches while also augmenting their basic modelling capacities.  
 
Understanding animals’ aesthetic behaviour creates the grounds for 
understanding the definition of human being. Sebeok juxtaposes the traditional 
pursuits of philosophical aesthetics with the task of defining life, again problematising 
pat distinctions between what is learned and what is biologically determined: 
 
The challenge, of course, is to explicitly define what those relations - of balance 
and order that delight - are in the characteristic idiom of each art, as well as in 
the all-embracing architectonics of the living megacosm. The concept of delight 
thus undergoes a radical transmutation: it is elevated into a function that 
biologists can recognize, objectify, cope with in familiar terms. The ‘artistic 
animal’ is not defined by a heightened sensitivity to movement, sound, color, 
shape, but by its innate and/or learned capacity to elicit a stable dynamic 
structure from the fluid environment, whether inorganic, organic, or a subtle 
blend of both. The sign systems thus created, which serve an underlying 
semantic function, take in time an aesthetic turn (58-9). 
 
Sebeok’s unravelling of the skeins in which classification and aesthetic behaviour are 
knit is, it is worth reiterating, subtended by the distinction in modelling between 
humans and non-human animals, with the latter utilising a limited store of averbal 
modes and the former having access to an extensive repertoire of both verbal and 
averbal modes, frequently producing hybrid modes of considerable complexity and 
nuance. A further distinction from contemporary semiotics needs to be added in order 
to provide a gloss on Sebeok’s telegraphic point and to emphasize its implication. It is 
is a simple observation, but one with notable ramifications: that the non-human 
animal’s aesthetic behaviour and its signs in general are not self-recognized as such. 
What the development of semiotics has enabled us to realize ─ a historical trajectory 
extending from Mongré 1897 through Rossi-Landi 1978, Deely 1990, Petrilli 1998, 
Deely 2003a and b, 2005, Deely-Petrilli-Ponzio 2005, to Deely’s 2010 synthesis ─   is 
that humans are distinct from non-human animals in that the former are ‘semiotic 
animals’: they recognize not only what signs signify at any one moment but also that 
there is such a thing as a sign. Non-human animals are restricted to their 
understanding of what a sign signifies in a particular and very direct context. With 
this point in mind, palpably survival-driven purposive signifying by non-human 
animals will most likely have little difference for them from their seemingly 
‘purposeless’ aesthetic behaviour. The distinction between the two kinds of semiosis 
is the result of human observation, informed by the knowledge that there is such a 
phenomenon as signification. 
 
Humans’ knowledge of signs, derived from our possession of ‘language’ or 
grammar, enables projection into the future in addition to our highly enhanced ability 
to classify in the present. In ‘Prefigurements’ (60), Sebeok observes that 
 
It seems clear that the fundamental role of the central nervous system is 
precisely to provide the creature with a local map simulating its position in the 
environment, to enable it to sort out, among other vital intelligence, the images 
of biologically and/or socially important organisms, viz., to distinguish prey 
from predator. This is surely best accomplished by an arrangement of such 
images into a distinctive feature matrix, or in terms of ‘likeness tempered with 
difference’. 
 
Effectively, classification enables humans to know their immediate environment and 
its co-habitants, to be able to draw maps of extended areas beyond their immediate 
environment and, ultimately, to function with reference to a cosmology. It also 
enables the devices of memory, from the complicated spatial mnemonic edifices 
invented by the ancient Greeks, through the memory palaces of the medieval Jesuits, 
up to all the storage facilities of post-literate culture. With reference to this, I was 
touched today by the homely reminiscences of Marcel Danesi as he related in his 
plenary paper the time he spent during childhood in a remote village in Northern Italy. 
He told how an elderly lady provided pre-electronic entertainment for children in the 
village during the evenings, telling them stories of their ancestors, in addition to 
ghoulish tales associated with the local cemetery. In this practice we have a sense of 
how narrative preserves community memory and, sometimes, indicates the terrors that 
lie beyond that community. Yet we also have a picture of memory both before the age 
of electronic memory and aesthetics, plus an illustration of the modes of memory 
after the advent of verbality and the techniques of modelling associated with it. 
Human mapping, again, exemplifies the constant trafficking between verbal and 
averbal sign systems. 
 
However, it is not the movement between putative different modelling centres 
in the brain that is the paradox arising from Sebeok’s ‘Prefigurements’. The ultimate 
paradox is that animals’ aesthetic behaviour is implicated in enhancing survival by 
not enhancing survival. Much, if not all, of the use-value of aesthetic behaviour 
consists in not appearing to possess use-value. Sebeok’s isolation in the semiosis of 
animals, including humans, of this paradox poses a major problem. It is interesting to 
know that non-human animals are potentially securing their allotted existence whilst 
furnishing their Umwelten; but what are humans doing? At a time when Western 
governments are almost unanimously focusing on science, technology and economic 
instrumentality (the latter invariably incorporated into the promotion of science and 
technology), aesthetic pursuits are the subject of policy regression and the humanities 
are experiencing annihilation through the withdrawal of funded and moral support 
(see ‘What the humanities are for – a semiotic perspective’, also included in this 
issue). In the face of this, it is common to hear many – especially in the academy – 
calling for a renewal of that old shibboleth, ‘Knowledge for its own sake’. This kind 
of defence, of course, is knee-jerk humanism, a retreat to the Land of Cockaigne, 
guaranteed to cut no ice with those too crass to see beyond economic instrumentalism. 
What ‘Prefigurements’ demonstrates, ineluctably, is that ‘Knowledge is for 
something’. It re-poses the big question for contemporary societies: “What do we 
pursue in order to maintain an activity which ensures our survival but is not often 
used instrumentally as such?”  
 
The preliminary answers to that question lie in the realization that aesthetic 
behaviour is survival – it locates humans in their world and enables humans to 
conceptualise the furnishing of that world. It has indispensable use-value and, in fact, 
underpins the very science and technology that economic instrumentality seeks to 
exploit. Thus, even on their own terms, arguments about - and policies supporting – 
economic instrumentalism in the sphere of knowledge are contradictory and 
directionless. The preliminary answers also lie in grasping that humans are semiotic 
animals, able to assess and analyse the signs that circulate in their Umwelt, capable of 
recapitulating the latent benefits of aesthetic behaviour. Foresight, to recognize how 
seemingly non-purposive signs enhance the Umwelt, is paramount, as well as analytic 
acumen in understanding the relation of aesthetic signs to human existence in the past, 
the present and the future. In sum, addressing the big question of aesthetic behaviour 
requires experienced, interdisciplinary technicians to be centrally involved. There can 
be no equivocation on this. 
 
Naturally, when the long-term benefits of an activity are obscure, there is 
difficulty in making them the core of a consensus. Yet, such difficulties are not 
insurmountable, particularly as the topic under discussion is one that cuts to the very 
nature of humans’ existence and their most ‘instinctive’ pursuits. Sebeok notes, with a 
nod to Peirce, 
 
The propensity to classify seems to have acquired, through evolution, 
diminishing survival value, but then so did sex: humans can enjoy either, but 
most tokens, though pleasurable per se, are not biologically relevant. Only the 
type of activity has a clearcut biological function (42). 
 
Although restaurants have garnered business for centuries, and prostitution has 
flourished for longer still, nobody, to my knowledge, has suggested that eating and 
sex should only ever be undertaken for the purposes of generating profit. If 
semioticians, following the example of Sebeok - who I am sorry is no longer 
physically with us to repel the forces of philistinism – are able to push the insights of 
‘Prefigurements’ to centre stage, then the absurd proposal for only ever engaging in 
aesthetic behaviour for brute economic purposes will be banished from the realms of 
common understanding. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you once more for your attention. 
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